Iran’s recent decision to supply Russia with short-range missiles could indicate a significant shift under President Masoud Pezeshkian, who was elected with the promise to ease sanctions and develop balanced relations with both Eastern and Western powers.
Pezeshkian’s appointment of former foreign minister Javad Zarif as an adviser and the debates in Tehran about Iran’s alignment with Russia suggest a complex approach to international relations. However, the missile sale appears to contradict Pezeshkian’s promises, raising questions about his control over Iran’s foreign policy.
Iranian skepticism toward Russia has been increasing, particularly concerning Russia’s actions in the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict and its stance on Iran’s territorial claims in the Strait of Hormuz.
The reformist press has often criticized Russia for hindering better relations between Iran and Europe, reflecting the complicated nature of Iran’s diplomatic stance. This context makes the recent missile deal a potentially controversial move that could impact Iran’s relations with the West.
Iran’s Missile Supply to Russia Raises Questions Over President Pezeshkian’s Foreign Policy Promises
Several theories could explain Iran’s decision to supply missiles to Russia. One possibility is that Iran might be denying its involvement while evidence is still being evaluated. Another theory suggests that Russia could be providing Iran with valuable resources or technology, such as nuclear materials, in return.
Additionally, Iran might see aligning with a potentially victorious Russia as strategically advantageous, given recent discussions between Russian and Iranian officials about deepening their partnership.
Another explanation is that Pezeshkian, despite his reformist stance, could be grappling with domestic challenges and the agreements made before his presidency.
The missile supply contract may have been finalized under the previous administration, and Pezeshkian might have been unable to alter or stop it due to pressing domestic issues. His concessions to conservative factions within Iran and the broader political context could influence his ability to implement significant foreign policy changes.
Lastly, it’s possible that Pezeshkian’s authority over Iran’s foreign policy is limited, with significant decisions still influenced by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
This suggests that while Pezeshkian may be publicly advocating for reform and improved relations with the West, the real power dynamics within Iran’s political system might constrain his ability to effect meaningful change. As a result, less than two months into his presidency, Pezeshkian’s efforts to improve relations with the West are overshadowed by a return to sanctions and geopolitical tensions.
